It is too early to conclude whether the all-party meeting held at Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s residence to reduce the trust deficit between New Delhi and the leaders of Jammu and Kashmir will succeed in building the foundations of a ‘New Jammu & Kashmir’. That the meeting was held, remarkably without rancor, does signal a new beginning after the momentous events of August 2019, which included the dilution of ‘Article 370’ and the preventive detention of meny of the leaders who attended the all-party meeting.
Clever Political Move:
Organising the all-party meeting was a clever political move by the Narendra Modi Government for a variety of reasons. For one, the narrative will now shift to how and when the Centre will (or not) concede to at least some of the demands made by the Kashmiri politicians from the more critical questions of whether the decision of 2019 has delivered on any of its declared objectives. Consider this. The two justifications made by Modi Government for the decisions of 2019 – ushering in new era of development and prosperity in J&K, and rooting out terrorism from Kashmir – seem to have disappeared from public memory today. There has been little development in the now Union Territory since 2019; if anything, the security lockdown post-2019 and the subsequent COVID-19 lockdown have only worsened economic conditions the Union Territory. What about terrorism and extremism? Until the India-Pakistan ceasefire of February 2021, the security situation in the Kashmir Valley saw no significant improvement despite the double lockdown nor was there a major let-up in infiltration from across the Line of Control (LoC). As for home-grown insurgency, there is no way to measure anti-India sentiments in the Union Territory given the strict security clampdown and the sub-sequent double lockdown. In any case, brandishing the absence of violent protests during a double lockdown as a measure of success of the 2019 decisions is methodologically erroneous, at the least. In short, neither has the removal of special status improved the economic conditions of the general population nor has it been helpful in rooting out Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in the Valley or reducing anti-India felings there.
Centre’s Policies, The World:
It is tempting, especially for out-of-work diplomats, to over-analyse New Delhi’s latest moves within a chessboard of a ‘Great Game’ being played out, reminiscent of 19th Century British strategies in the region. Anyone who has studied New Delhi policies since the troubles of the 1990s will recognise that the Centre’s policies on Jammu and Kashmir rarely shift under international pressure, even while tactical gestures may be made to assuage the sentiments of what the establishment often describes as woodly-headed liberals.
In the hostile atmosphere of the early 1990s, when India was confronted with a full-blown insurgency in the Kashmir Vealley and India’s staunchest ally, the Soviet Union had collapsed, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia (and Central Asia), Robin L. Raphel (with direct access to U.S. President Bill Clinton) questioned Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to India. Indian Prime Minister P.V.Narsimha Rao’s fragile coalition, within an economically precarious India, refused to concede ground in any substantial measure. Surely, it is surreal to belive that the Modi government would do so under pressure from the Joe Biden administration or gratuitous advice from its Acting Assistant Secretary of South Asia, even while the photo opportunity presented by the all-party meeting would, of course, be flashed by the media czars of the Ministry of External Affairs across the globe.
Similarly, while the dangers to Afghanistan from the gradual takeover by the Taliban are real and present, it is difficult to find any evidence that the once-messianic students rooted in the madrassas of the Frontier will now turn their attention to Kashmir. Moreover, any backchannel that exists between India and Pakistan that led to a successful ceasefire on the Line of Control is reflective much more of Rawalpindi’s own internal fault lines and problems on multiple fronts, than any real concession toward India. To be sure, if Pakistan’s leadership wanted a face saver to stand down from its fierce reaction to the ‘Ides of August’, Narendra Modi has provided the very steps to down the ante.
From A Position of Strength:
Counterintuitively, the Modi government seems to have acted unilaterally precisely because there is a window of opportunity where it can speak and act from a position of almost absolute strength. Even while there are stray incidents of violence, terrorism and millitancy are at their lowest levels in recent years; there is little popular disqulet that is finding expression in the streets of the towns and the cities of Kashmir; and the separatists are either in jail or are surprisingly silent. The popular press, once a source of anxiety for the establishment, has either been arm-twisted into projecting good news or found it pragmatic to do so give the scrutiny of central law enforecement agencies on almost every private institution of importance and influence in the Union Territory.
Themainstream of political parties, who had been derided by the Centre as the ‘Gupkar Gang’ et al and detained for months, (who had taken an absolutist stand on the dilution of Article 370) seem to have found at least a modicum of accommodation with the Centre, at least good enough for all of them to respond positively to the Prime Minise’s invitation. In sum the employment of the entire spectrum of Kautilyan policies (Saam, Daam, Dand and Bhed – Persuade, Purchase, Punish and Exploit the Weakness) have helped to create this new space; this is not to justify the Centre’s conduct, but merely find a convincing explanation for the remarkable degree of acquiescence to the Centre’s policies, admittedly within the convenient judicial cover provided by the Supreme Court of India having admited but not heard the case on the ligitimcy of the dilution of Article 370. As the Harvard trained legal ace, Muzaffar
Beigh, apparently declared in the all-party meeting: any discussion on Article 370 could be tantamount to contempt of the Supreme Court given its sub judice status.
In turn, the Centre also seems to have realised that there are limits to which Chaplinesque ‘Little Dictators’ from the bureaucracy, and their minions can deliver in terms of better public services or investment opportunities despite the laudable intentions of the Lieutenant Governor of Jammu and Kashmir, Manoj Sinha.
The state of delivery of public service has not improved significantly nor has promised investment from corporate groups translated into reality. The promise of Kashmir remains just that: the promise of Kashmir!
Need For A Local Connect:
Moreover, the experience in Jammu and Kashmir has amplified the Sangh Parivar’s long-standing recognition that real leaders cannot be manufactured, but have to be connected organically to the grassroots and supported by a cadre of dedicated workers. The over-reliance on a new crop of shifty leaders, who were paraded into television studios or before visiting diplomats (and who zealously mouthed Bharat Mata ki Jai) had the strong imprint of an intelligence operation, and was, in any case, counterproductive amongst even those already sympathetic to New Delhi’s narrative on Kashmir. The elections to the District Development Council demonstrated that the Bharatiya Janta Party, the National Conference, the Congress, Peoples Democratic Party, People’s Conference and the Apni Party – all of whom relied on the political leaders of the so-called Ancien Regime – still had a significant constituency amongst the voters of the State.
Federal relations are dynamic even in countries with almost inviolabe rights of the States, including the United States. For most of the 2th century, even much before India’s Independence, New Delhi’s policies towards this border reggion have moved between tight central control and a gentler federal grip that provided space for autonomous self-governance. When the Brtish sold Kashmir to the Dogra ruler, Gulab Singh, they wanted to secure the frontiers, but not be responsible for governance. But the British Empire too realised, especially within the reign of Pratap Singh, that they could not firewall security from governance.
Bilateral Implications:
As for Pakistan, it had maintained ever since August 2019 that it would not engage in a dialogue process with India until New Delhi retracts the Kashmir decisions of 2019. Pakistan tried to internationalise what it called India’s “annexation” of Kashmir but garnered little support, and increased the heat on LoC and inside Kashmir, again to no avail. Islamabad’s stated position has evidently changed with the February 2021 ceasefire agreement on the LoC and the backchannel talks preceding it. There is an emergent and strong opinion within Pakistan hood in J&K, it might open doors for a dialogue process. Therefore, if New Delhi offers Statehood to J&K, Pakistan might be open to talks with India.
Put differently, by offering to return Statehood to Kashmir and politically burying the issue of J&K’s special status, New Delhi has won a tactical victory over Pakistan without making any real concessions. On the other hand, Pakistan would have to walk back fromits preconditions for talks with India by agreeing to New Delhi’s half-measure on Kashmir. On the brighter side, however, this undoubtedly has the potential to bring the two sides to the negotiating table on various outstanding bilateral issues. New Delhi’s current advantage in Kashmir over Pakistan could also be read wit the lessons from the Balakot stand-off in early 2019. By carrying out a strike against Pakistan in its Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, New Delhi created a new military normal between the two sides, i.e., counterterror strikes inside Pakistan could occur in case of a terror attack against India notwithstanding the Pakistani response, which as the ensuing air skirmish showed is likely to remain at the low conventional level. In other words, New Delhi has clearly sinalled to Pakistan how far it will go on the Kashmir question and how far it will tolerate the menace of terrorism.
The Challenges:
Whether or not the BJP’s political gain vis-a-vis the Kashmiri political parties and tactical gain over Pakistan will help root out insurgency and terrorism from Kashmir is something we will have to wait and see. That the BJP government has not politically reached out to the Kashmiri dissidents is indicative of the fact that it will want to single-handedly dictate the contours of politics in Jmmuand Kashmir – ceding limited space to the mainstream political paties, and little space for either the dissidents or Pakistan. Whether this policy willfind success on the ground once Kashmir opens up and normal political activity resumes there is an important question. Acursory glance at Jammu and Kashmir’s history would show that New Delhi’s deals with Kashmir’s mainstream politicians routinely found little favour with either the ordinary Kashmiri or the agitating Kashmiri. In that sense, then, it is too early for New Delhi to claim victory in Kashmir.
END